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Abstract
As labor provisions in trade agreements have become increasingly ubiquitous, there remain questions about whether or
not these provisions have been effective in improving working conditions in trading partner countries. Through an analysis
of sample labor provisions in United States and European Union free trade agreements, this paper shows that both ap-
proaches, albeit using different methods, aim primarily to improve de jure labor law and de facto enforcement of that law
by government regulatory institutions. This paper argues that instead, labor provisions ought to be grounded in a supply
chain approach. A supply chain approach shifts the focus from impacting de jure and de facto labor law as administered
by the state though sanctions or dialogue, and towards context specific, experimental, and coordinated private and public
regulatory interventions that operate in key export industries that are implicated in trading partners’ supply chains. It does
so in part by recognizing the potential regulatory power of consumer citizenship.
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1. Introduction
Labor provisions have become increasingly common
in bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs)
across the globe. Utilizing varying mechanisms, these
provisions seek to ensure that labor conditions in work-
places connected to global trade adequately respect in-
ternational core labor rights and domestic labor law. In-
deed, according to the International Labor Organization
(ILO), it is now more unusual not to include labor provi-
sions than to include them. The ILO (2016) states that as
of December 2015 there were 76 trade agreements, cov-
ering 135 countries, that included labor provisions. Over
half of these agreementswere concluded post-2008, and
over 80% of all FTAs that came into force since 2013 con-
tain labor provisions (ILO, 2016, p. 1). This growth in la-
bor rights conditionality and promotion has been paral-
leled in investment agreements, where 12 out of the 31
International Investment Agreements concluded in 2014
refer to the protection of labor rights, including ILO in-
struments (ILO, 2016, p. 2).
The United States (US) has been a pioneer in these
efforts. Labor provisions have been a core element of its
trade agenda since the 1980s, with the incorporation of
labor conditionality in its Generalized System of Prefer-
ences scheme.1 In the European Union (EU), labor provi-
sions have been part of trade policy since 1995, playing
a significantly greater role in 2008 with the CARIFORUM
agreement (De Ville, Orbie, & Van den Putte, 2016, p. 22).
The two approaches differ. The US approach is grounded
in a state action-state sanctionsmodel that requires a) de
jure changes in labor law, and b) de facto enforcement
of those laws, violation of which is subject to dispute
settlement and sanctions. The EU’s model, on the other
hand, is grounded in a promotional or cooperative ap-
proach (De Ville et al., 2016, pp. 16–17), that aims to
1 In 1987, Congress included labor conditionality in the Generalized Systems of Preferences program, requiring that the president determine that a re-
cipient country has “taken steps” towards “affording internationally recognized workers rights” to its citizens. In its regional and bilateral free trade
agreements, it first included a side agreement on labor in NAFTA, its free trade agreement with Mexico and Canada.
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export norms, primarily through incentives and dialogic
institutions (Orbie, 2011, p. 180). Its primary tools are
thus not threat of sanctions, but rather social dialogue.
Both of these models have come under intense scrutiny,
however, by a number of scholars who argue that as
a whole, they have been either ineffective at improv-
ing working conditions in trading partner countries, or
are effective in only limited ways (Brown, 2015; Giumelli
& Van Roozendaal, 2016; Orbie & Van den Putte, 2016;
Van Roozendaal, 2015; Vogt, 2015). The proposed solu-
tions to this problem vary, and some scholars recognize
that there is no one size fits all solution and that con-
verting labor provisions into real improvements in labor
rights and standards is complex anddependent on anum-
ber of factors (Giumelli & Van Roozendaal, 2016). But
many of the critiques, particularly from trade union ac-
tivists, argue that the key to improving the effectiveness
of these agreements is to strengthen the dispute settle-
ment procedures and arm them with bigger and better
sticks that are used with greater frequency, i.e. applying
harsher sanctions.
This paper takes a different approach. It argues that
both the US and the EU models as currently designed
are limited in their ability to achieve sustainable de jure
and de facto improvements in labor standards in their
trading partner countries, but not primarily because of
their weak sanctioning power. Instead, this paper argues
that trade and labor chapters ought to adopt a supply
chain governance approach. A supply chain governance
approach shifts the current focus of labor chapters from
broadly affecting de jure and de facto labor law through
the use of sanctions or dialogue, towards context specific
and coordinated private and public regulatory interven-
tions that focus on improving labor rights and standards
in key export industries. Such experimental regulatory
tools are rooted in what some scholars describe as gover-
nance, or sometimes “new governance” approaches to
regulation (Van Den Putte & Orbie, 2015). Just as firms
have increasingly responded to consumer and civil soci-
ety pressure to supplement inadequate state labor reg-
ulation through private supply chain governance, labor
provisions should build on these social and market dy-
namics. That means developing governance based insti-
tutions that draw on tools of consumer citizenship to
achieve their stated goals of improving labor conditions
and respecting labor rights. In otherwords, to solve a sup-
ply chain problem, we need supply chain solutions.
2. The EU and US Legal Frameworks
Before proposing a new framework, we must first de-
scribe the extant models that it would replace, focus-
ing on the examples of the US and EU. The EU and US
use different tools to achieve their stated goals, reflect-
ing in part differing philosophies. Both of these models
are primarily rooted in a traditional approach to interna-
tional relations and law that seeks to influence the de
jure and de facto conduct of state actors, through means
that Oehri (2015, pp. 734–735) describes as both “hier-
archical”, i.e. political and judicial enforcement, and “net-
worked”, i.e. assistance and collaboration.
2.1. The US Approach
The US approach to its labor chapters can be described
as a state action-state sanctions model (Kolben, 2007).
The primary aim and tools of such a model is to change
a trading partner country’s de jure labor laws, and to im-
prove their de facto enforcement (Vogt, 2015). The US
model has gone through several iterations over time, be-
ginning with the NAFTA side agreement on labor cooper-
ation, and evolving into amodel adopted as per an agree-
ment between the Bush administration and Congress on
May 10, 2007, known generally as the May 10 agree-
ment (Bolle, 2016). Each new generation of labor chap-
ter has iteratively strengthened its requirements and en-
forcement provisions.
Here, we will use the Trans-Pacific Partnership agree-
ment2 (TPP) as our primary object of analysis to illus-
trate the USmodel. This is because it was the latest labor
chapter thatwas negotiated, and even though the Trump
administration subsequently withdrew from the TPP, it
a) still serves as amodel for whatmight come ahead, and
b) reflects the policy assumptions that have informed US
labor chapters heretofore. However, it also increasingly
utilized dialogue and other non-sanctions methods that
have been more typically associated with the EU model.
Labor provisions function in two stages: Pre-ratific-
ation, and post-ratification. During the pre-ratification
stage, states will agree formally or informally to make
specific changes to their labor laws as a condition for sign-
ing the FTA. According to some scholars, it is at this stage
that labor provisions have been most effective in foster-
ing real reform (Kim, 2012; Vogt, 2015). The TPP effec-
tively formalized the pre-ratification improvement pro-
cess by including three formal agreements, called Labour
Consistency Plans (LCP). These were concludedwith Viet-
nam, Malaysia, and Brunei. The Vietnam LCP focused
on Vietnam’s restrictions on independent grass roots
unions, and required that Vietnam allow such unions
to operate and self-govern. This would have brought
Vietnam into compliance with ILO standards, as well as
come closer into compliance with US expectations of
how an industrial relations system should be organized.
TheMalaysia LCP called onMalaysia to ban the withhold-
ing of migrant worker passports, ban the payment of re-
cruitment fees by workers, and reduce government dis-
cretion in registering trade unions. The Brunei LCP called
on the country to, for example, implement nondiscrimi-
nation laws and enact a minimum wage.
The second way in which labor provisions function
is during the post-ratification stage by utilizing the in-
2 Trans-Pacific Partnership, signed on February 4, 2016, withdrawn by the US on January 23, 2017. Full text available at https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text
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stitutions provided for in the labor provision. Here, the
TPP adopted and slightly strengthened the labor chap-
ters that came before it, requiring that the parties “adopt
and maintain in its statutes and regulations the…[core
labor] rights as stated in the ILO Declaration” (TPP,
Art. 19.3.1),3 and that “each Party shall adopt and main-
tain statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder,
governing acceptable conditions of work with respect to
minimumwages, hours of work, and occupational safety
and health” (TPP, Article 19.3.2).
The second leg of the US model is a non-derogation
clause, which provides that, “no party shall fail to effec-
tively enforce its labor laws through a sustained or recur-
ring course of action or inaction in a manner affecting
trade or investment between the Parties after the date
of entry into force of this Agreement” (TPP, Art. 19.5.)
This proviso attempts to incentivize adequate de facto
enforcement of a party’s labor laws, which of course are
supposed to comply with the de jure requirements.
The third leg is the dispute settlement provision.
While the labor chapter is subject to the general dispute
settlement provisions of TPP, the parties must first en-
gage in a consultative process, known as labor consulta-
tions (TPP, Art 19.15.2). If the parties cannot resolve the
issue within sixty days through consultations or through
other consultative mechanisms available to them, then
the “requesting party” may begin general dispute settle-
ment procedures (TPP, 19.15.8–10).
But the TPP also makes efforts to increase reliance
on dialogue and cooperation that brings it closer to the
EU model, which we will examine below, and that also
opens the door to alternative and experimental mech-
anisms of supply chain governance. For example, as an
effort to encourage dialogue over conflict, the TPP pro-
vides a mechanism outside of dispute settlement that
is new for US FTA labor chapters known as “cooperative
labour dialogue” (TPP, Art. 19.11). If a party chooses to
initiate dialogue under this section on any matter aris-
ing out of the chapter, the parties shall commence dia-
logue within 30 days (TPP, 19.11.3) and the parties shall
address all the issues in the request (TPP, Art. 19.11.5),
“receiving and considering views of interested parties in
the matter” (TPP, Art. 19.11.3). One way that the agree-
ment provides that the parties may address the raised is-
sues is through “independent verification of compliance
or implementation by…entities, such as the ILO” (TPP,
Art. 19.11.6(b)). This provision differs from earlier labor
chapters in that the emphasis is on dialogue, and is not
a necessary precursor to, or constituent element of, dis-
pute settlement procedures.
The TPP also promotes and provides for various kinds
of engagement and dialogue with the public. Article
19.14, for example, provides that the Labour Council
shall “provide a means for receiving and considering the
views of interested persons on matters related to this
Chapter”. It then also provides that each Party “shall es-
tablish or maintain, and consult, a national labor consul-
tative or advisory or similar mechanism, for members of
its public, including representatives of its labor and busi-
ness organizations, to provide views on matters regard-
ing this Chapter” (TPP, 19.14(2)).
The TPP also hints at an openness to methods be-
yond the traditional state action-state sanctions model
in other ways. For example, one article calls for each
party to “encourage enterprises to voluntarily adopt cor-
porate social responsibility initiatives on labor issues that
have been endorsed or are supported by that party” (TPP,
Art. 19.7). This is a non-binding obligation that estab-
lishes a promotional framework for companies within
each party’s jurisdiction, whether it be lead firms or sup-
pliers, to take action above and beyond what they might
be legally obligated to do. Thus any pressure for com-
panies to act or “self-regulate”, would have to emanate
from consumers and other stakeholders. We will return
to that topic in Part 3, for it is key in developing a supply
chain approach to trade and labor provisions.
2.2. The EU Approach
While the US model is primarily grounded in a state
action-state sanctions approach with increasing reliance
on dialogue, the EU approach might be termed at state
action-social dialogue approach. That is, while the fo-
cus of the labor chapter is on the law and conduct of
states, themeans of improving labor standards in partner
countries is through a “promotional” mechanism (Cam-
pling, Harrison, Richardson, & Smith, 2016). The EU is not
alone in adopting a promotional strategy, for some 40%
of trade agreements, according to the ILO use such an
approach (Campling et al., 2016, p. 361).
The EU’s model differs in several ways from the US
model both in its general framework as well as its insti-
tutions. As we used the non-implemented TPP as an ex-
ample of the US approach, we will use the implemented
EU–Colombia and Peru Agreement,4 to which Ecuador
acceded in 2017, as our EU model (EU–Colombia).5 One
significant difference from the USmodel is that the labor
provisions in EU agreements are found in a chapter enti-
tled Trade and Sustainable Development that treats not
just labor but also environmental issues. The agreement
provides that, “each party commits to the promotion and
effective implementation in its laws and practices” of the
fundamental ILO conventions (EU–Colombia, Art. 269).
To achieve this, the same article discusses the impor-
3 Like in previous agreements, these rights are explicitly limited to those stated in the declaration, which is noted by a number of scholars to be an effort
not to specifically link them to any requirements to adopt the correlated eight ILO conventions, of which the US has only ratified two (Brown, 2015,
pp. 387–388).
4 Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part, EU–Colombia–Peru,
on June 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 354) 3.
5 Although the EU has more variation in its agreements than does the US, most of the “new generation” FTAs follow a similar blueprint. (Campling et al.,
2016, p. 363)
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tance of “dialogue” (EU–Colombia, Art. 269.2), informa-
tion exchange (EU–Colombia, Art. 269.4), and empha-
sizes that labor standards should not be used for protec-
tionist ends (EU–Colombia, Art. 269.5).
Like the US model, the EU FTA has a non-derogation
clause, whereby a) “no party shall encourage trade or in-
vestment by reducing the levels of protection afforded
in its…labour laws” (EU–Colombia, Art. 277.1), and b) “a
party shall not fail to effectively enforce…its labour laws
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inac-
tion in a manner affecting trade or investment between
the parties” (EU–Colombia, Art. 277.2). This language is
very similar to the US model. The main difference is that
the US model as manifested in the TPP requires that the
parties not derogate from enforcing ILO core labor rights
or laws related tominimumwages, hours ofwork, and oc-
cupational health and safety (TPP, Art. 19.3-19.4), which
the EU approach does not do.
While the substantive requirements are not very dis-
similar, the institutional and enforcement mechanisms
diverge quite a bit. The EU agreement provides for an in-
stitutional and monitoring mechanism that emphasizes
dialogue and a collaborative relationship. First, it estab-
lishes a subcommittee on trade and sustainable devel-
opment that oversees implementation of the trade and
sustainability provision of the agreement (EU–Colombia,
Art. 280.4). Its work is to be “based on dialogue, effec-
tive cooperation…and…mutually satisfactory solutions”
(EU–Colombia, Art. 280.5). A primary aim of the subcom-
mittee is to “promote transparency and public participa-
tion”, and its output it to be shared publicly and be sub-
ject to public comment (EU–Colombia, Art. 280.7). Once
a year, the subcommittee is mandated to meet and to
hold a “dialogue with civil society organizations and the
public at large” on matters related to trade and sustain-
ability (EU–Colombia, Art. 282). To ensure representa-
tion and ongoing consultation and dialogue, a second
cooperative and dialogue based institution is provided
for, Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs). These groups are
meant to be mechanisms that provide ongoing input
to their relevant governments (EU–Colombia, Art. 281).
The DAGs are required to have a “balanced representa-
tion of representative organizations” (EU–Colombia, Art.
281), and all the stakeholders that are meant to consti-
tute DAGs have a right to participate in the yearly pub-
lic committee meeting (EU–Colombia, Art. 282.2). Like
the US labor chapters, the EU promotes its cooperative
approach in a separate section that “recognizes the im-
portance of cooperation activities”, delineates those ar-
eas, and explicitly notes the importance of certification
schemes (EU–Colombia, Art. 286(g)) and of “good prac-
tices of corporate social responsibility” (EU–Colombia,
Art. 286(j)).
The EU approach to disputes differs from the US ap-
proach primarily in that there is no resort to dispute
settlement procedures at all. It is here that a number
of commentators have been particularly critical of the
EU (Bartels, 2017). Instead, if there is a conflict, as in
the US model, there are to be consultations between
the parties (EU–Colombia, Art. 283). If this does not
resolve the matter, then the Committee may be con-
vened (EU–Colombia, Art. 283.3), and the subcommit-
tee “shall periodically publish reports” about the pro-
cess and outcomes of the consultations (EU–Colombia,
Art. 283.4). If the parties can’t resolve the matter within
90 days (EU–Colombia, Art. 284.1), a group of experts
is selected by the parties that after a delineated period
of time issues a final report (EU–Colombia, Art. 285.2).
A non-confidential version of this report must then be
made public. Adherence and compliance basically relies
on “naming and shaming”, because the parties must be
persuaded, educated, or perhaps pressured by the pub-
lic after the report’s release for there to be corrective ac-
tion taken.
2.3. Comparison
As some scholars have argued, the differences between
the US and EUmodels might bemore in form than in sub-
stance (Van Den Putte & Orbie, 2015). Both, for themost
part, rely on the ILO core labor standards as the bench-
mark standard, although the US in its TPP labor chapter
created a minimalist requirement to enact laws related
to non-core standards. Both the EU and US approaches
emphasize dialogue and cooperation though various in-
stitutions and processes of stakeholder engagement, al-
though the EU is more explicit in this regard, as shown
above. While the US approach provides for sanctions in
case a mutually agreeable solution cannot be achieved,
the stick of sanctions can only be utilized after a consul-
tative process. Finally, some have argued that while the
US model does provide for the possibility of sanctions if
there is found to be a violation of the labor chapter by
an arbitration panel, the report issued by the group of
experts in the EU model serves a similar function as the
arbitration panel, but just without the big stick. (Van Den
Putte & Orbie, 2015, pp. 269–270).
A number of commentators have argued that a core
failure of both the EU and the US models is that the lack
of sticks in the EU model (Bartels, 2017), and the lack
of adequate utilization of those sticks in the US model
has led to them being ineffective (Vogt, 2015). While
the US has a more vigorous dispute settlement proce-
dure on paper, it is argued, in fact it has been seldom
used, and resolution of complaints has taken years (Van
Roozendaal, 2015). Van Roozendaal (2015) notes that in
Guatemala, for example, that despite the initiation of a
complaints procedure against it and the risk of sanction,
Guatemala has made little progress in reforming its la-
bor laws to bring them into conformitywith international
law, or Guatemala’s practices.6 One reason for this, ac-
cording to Van Roozendaal (2015, p. 21), is because of
6 Guatemala was primarily accused in the complaint of violations of freedom of association rights under ILO Conventions 87 and 98, including violence
against trade union leaders.
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the weakness of the sanctions mechanism in the CAFTA–
DR agreement, which capped fines at $15 million—not a
sum that is likely to incentivize action on its own.
Other scholars, however, argue that the EU’s dia-
logue based approach is in fact productive, leading to
improved workers’ rights outcomes in partner countries.
Postnikov and Bastiaens (2014, pp. 927–928), for exam-
ple, argue that civil society actors in trading partners
learn from their EU counterparts how to pressure state
actors to improve labor rights enforcement. The ILO has
concluded that one of the more successful aspects of
trade agreements has been the multi-stakeholder insti-
tutions, leading to increase public awareness of labor
issues, enhanced social dialogue, and increased ability
to put labor issues on the political agenda (ILO, 2016,
pp. 39–40).
Another potential problem with both models is that
they require the political will of governments to enforce
them. Non-state actors do not have the right to bring
complaints against, or start dialogue with, other govern-
ments; only the state parties themselves do.7 Thus as
Vogt (2015, p. 859) notes, given this fact, “the agree-
ments will only be as useful as politicians desire them
to be”. Indeed, despite extreme abuses found in Jordan’s
garment industry, the US declined to trigger the dispute
settlement process provided for in the US-Jordan FTA’s
labor chapter (Kolben, 2013). Adopting a similar rational-
ist argument, Van Roozendaal (2015) argues that enforce-
ment is only likely to occur, not from a commitment to la-
bor rights, but rather as a means of securing support for
more FTAs in the future. To address this some scholars
have argued that a third party complaintmechanism that
eliminates government discretion might resolve this po-
litical will problem (Brown, 2015, p. 398). Indeed, accord-
ing to the US Department of Labor, of the seven submis-
sions that have been accepted for reviewunder the trade
and labor chapters since 2007, only one has gone to an
arbitral panel, the Guatemala case, discussed above. And
despite great hopes by trade unions and labor activists,
the arbitral panel found in favor of Guatemala.8
3. A Supply Chain Approach to Trade and Labor
Provisions
So given the somewhat grim and sometimes conflict-
ing assessments of the effectiveness and achievements
heretofore of labor provisions in FTAs, is there an alterna-
tive or perhaps complementary path forward? It is sug-
gested here that there is. The argument is that trade
and labor provisions should not focus uniquely on im-
pacting de jure and de facto state action broadly con-
strued, as they do now, but rather be tailored to en-
sure that the working conditions and core labor rights
protections in each other’s supply chains meet the ex-
pectations of each other’s citizenry. As Campling et al.
(2016, p. 366) have posed the question, should labor
provisions “seek to promote overall improvements in la-
bor standards in third countries, or focus only on key ex-
port industries”? The suggestion here is that they should
emphasize the latter, drawing on the leverage of con-
sumer citizens and the regulatory tools of governance
and democratic experimentalism.
3.1. Consumer Citizenship
To understand how a supply chain approach to labor
chapters could potentially be effective, we need to un-
derstand consumer citizenship. Consumer citizenship is
the notion that consumers exercise and express politi-
cal preferences through their consumptive choices (John-
ston, 2008; Stolle & Micheletti, 2013) It is the “use of
the market as an arena for politics in order to change
institutional or market practices found to be ethically,
environmentally, or politically objectionable” (Stolle &
Micheletti, 2013, p. 39).9 Consumer citizens make con-
sumptive choices based on a set of ethical or other crite-
ria that provides meaning for them. They can “buycott”,
meaning rewarding certain companies by favoring them
in their purchases, and/or boycott, by punishing bad ac-
tors by refusing to buy from them and encouraging oth-
ers to do the same (Stolle & Micheletti, 2013, p. 40).
According to Stolle and Michelleti (2013, p. 97),
about 31% of all people report engaging in either buy-
cotting, boycotting, or both. In Sweden, for example, ap-
proximately 60% of respondents report doing so, while
by contrast in the US, some 28% report doing so (Stolle
& Micheletti, 2013, p. 97). The dramatic rise in popular-
ity of so called Fair Trade branded goods is one mani-
festation of this (Fairtrade International, 2016; Nicholls,
2010), and experimental research has suggested that in
certain conditions, particularly for higher cost items, con-
sumers are willing to pay more for clothing and grocery
store items that are labeled as being made in better con-
ditions (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2015; Hainmueller, His-
cox, & Sequeira, 2015). Consumer demand for socially
compliant goods is also reflected in the degree to which
lead firms have implemented codes of conduct in their
supply chains and have joined various multi-stakeholder
initiatives (Locke, 2013). Over 9,000 companies have
joined the Global Compact, for example, which requires
a public commitment to its 10 principles, including a
commitment to human rights and internationally recog-
nized core labor rights and reporting on how those prin-
ciples are embedded in their operations.10 The recog-
7 Instead, individuals may make submissions to the parties, which are then considered, and then may at the discretion of the parties be considered for
review and then brought as a consultation or complaint against another party to the agreement.
8 In the Matter of Guatemala—Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA–DR, final report of the panel, June 14, 2017.
9 Scholars have alternatively termed this phenomenon political consumerism, (Stolle &Micheletti, 2013) ethical consumption (Eckhardt, Belk, &Devinney,
2010), and conscientious consumerism (Bartley, Koos, Samel, Setrini, & Summers, 2015).
10 The Global Compact, the Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, available at https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles; also,
theUNGlobal Compact, Communication on Progress: An Introduction (2015), available at https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/communication_on_
progress/Intro_to_COP.pdf
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nition of consumer citizenship’s potential as a political
and market factor could be better utilized in labor provi-
sions design.
3.2. Experimental Labor Provisions
If global citizen consumers are increasingly interested in
purchasing goods that they can be ensured were made
in conditions that meet their social preferences, then to
capitalize on this, labor provisions should create institu-
tions that target the supply chains to which consumer
citizens have a direct connection. Bolstering the qual-
ity of a country’s labor regulatory regime is a worthy
but very ambitious project. But we have seen that la-
bor provisions have not been particularly successful in
achieving that goal. The reasons for domestic regulatory
weakness are highly complex, and are contingent on a
broad set of factors, including democratic functioning,
economic development, and complex dimensions of rule
of law. A labor rights clause grounded in state to state di-
alogue or even sanctions is a poor tool to address these
highly complex problems. The aims and goals of labor
provisions as they are currently conceived might thus be
too broadly targeted to achieve concrete improvements
in actual workplaces that are directly connected to the
economies and citizens of the trading partner countries.
This squanders an opportunity.
Accordingly, it is argued here that a better way is
a tailored supply chain approach that draws on the in-
sights of governance theory and democratic experimen-
talism (Kolben, 2015; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008). Broadly
speaking, governance and democratic experimentalism
recognize the limitations of centralized legal decision
making, and look to alternative mechanisms of decen-
tered governance that promote deliberation, experimen-
tation, benchmarking, transparency, and best practice
to build effective, bottom up systems of governance
(Black, 2008). In some forms, legal interventions are used
to spark reflexive systems of self-regulation (Rogowski,
2013). Governance based regulatory approaches can be
particularly well suited to developing countries, where
regulatory capacity is already weak, and can be comple-
mented by non-state regulatory tools.
Some scholars have argued that the EU’s use of di-
alogue and cooperation is already complementary to a
governance model (Campling et al., 2016; Van Den Putte
& Orbie, 2015). In fact, the same could be said of the
US regime, as well. It, too, attempts to generate dia-
logue and cooperation between the parties and provides
for stakeholder engagement. And there is nothing in the
US model that excludes the addition of a provision that
would specify a set of institutions that would be oriented
towards an experimentalist and governance approach.
Campling et al. (2016, p. 360) claim that, “we are cur-
rently witnessing a period of experimentation whereby
different models of labor provisions are operating in bi-
lateral trade agreements between different trading part-
ners. These models differ greatly in terms of scope of
trade, scope of labor provisions, methods of promotion
and methods of enforcement”.
But the extent to which this is occurring is arguable.
While there might be variety in methods and processes
utilized in different agreements, by and large they all
draw upon the same toolkit, which include effective en-
forcement and implementation of laws, adherence to in-
ternational labor standards, non-derogation from those
standards, and some forms of stakeholder engagement
(ILO, 2016, p. 10). Instead, a truly experimental approach
would be more micro based, and build on the cooper-
ative and dialogue based instruments that have been
developing in the various labor provisions models. For
example, in the TPP, Article 19.7 calls for each party
to “encourage enterprises to voluntarily adopt corpo-
rate social responsibility initiatives on labour issues that
have been endorsed or are supported by that party”.
In the EU–Colombia Agreement (Art. 271.3), “the Par-
ties agree to promote best business practices related
to corporate social responsibility”, and to “exchange
information…related to the promotion…of good prac-
tices of corporate social responsibility…” (EU–Colombia,
Art. 286(j)).
Policymakers should use the principles of Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR), dialogue and cooperation
that are thinly specified in the agreements, and make
them thick through actual institutions that can draw on
the dynamics of consumer citizenship described earlier.
The test for their effectiveness should not be whether
there will be wholesale change in the politics and en-
forcement of labor law in a regime in which there is gen-
eral and wholesale weak rule of law, but rather if there
has been specific, measurable labor standards and rights
improvements in the relevant supply chains.
But this is hardly to say one should just forget about
the state. On the contrary, by focusing more on the mi-
cro level than labor provisions currently do, the broader
goals of macro level improvements in labor law enforce-
ment could also be achieved. How might this be accom-
plished? While a longer discussion of how these dynam-
icsmight operate is beyond the scope of this paper, schol-
ars have begun investigating the ways that private regu-
lation can interact with and sometimes reinforce or bol-
ster state regulation (Amengual & Chirot, 2016; Dupper,
Fenwick, & Hardy, 2016; Kolben, 2015). Moreover, it is
also important to emphasize that the experimental ap-
proaches argued for here are not the same as CSR, soft
law, or other purely private mechanisms. Rather, they
draw on public and private tools of regulation with the
explicit goal of strengthening public regulatory capacity.
The task then is to draw on the insights of regulatory
scholars and re-orient labor provisions towards harness-
ing the potential of private monitoring initiatives, while
consciously directing them towards dialoguing with and
bolstering state capacity.
Trade agreements provide a central leverage point
to create these programs because of opportunities pre
and post-ratification to implement them. Trade agree-
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ments should condition their passage and tariff benefits
on the implementation of experimental programs that
have been shown to improve working conditions at the
factory level.11 Over time, tariff benefits and perhaps
other restrictive rules such as rules of origin can be lib-
eralized depending on the degree of implementation or
success of the supply chain labor institutions provided
for. One could imagine granting the power to a third
party, such as the ILO, to determine if the institutions
have been implemented as required in the treaty.
A supply chain approach relies on governance based
tools of monitoring, benchmarking, transparency, and
competition. Institutional design should be variable and
context contingent. One proposed model is an integra-
tive approach (Kolben, 2007). In contrast to some gov-
ernance based models, it prioritizes regulatory capacity
building, and thus seeks to create and drawupon dialogic
modes of interaction between private and public actors
with the goal of mutual learning and improving the ca-
pacity of public regulatory institutions. A more complex
iteration of a supply chain oriented labor chapter institu-
tion might require mechanisms of information gathering
on factory labor conditions that would be made publicly
available. The program would be directed by a master
governance council at the top, and multiple local coun-
cils composed of various stakeholders. The local coun-
cils that would decide how to implement the labor pro-
vision’s overall monitoring directives and remedial goals
(Kolben, 2007, p. 248). Factory level compliance infor-
mation would be collected and shared by competing pri-
vate and public actors, who might use varying method-
ologies to collect information and address problems.12
The quality of those methodologies, as well as the per-
formance of subsidiary councils, would in turn be evalu-
ated by the master council or another supervisory body
(Kolben, 2007, p. 250). The labor provision, for example,
might call for a panel of experts to evaluate and compare
the quality of different local monitoring initiatives, or del-
egate this task to the ILO.
A more simplified, and probably feasible, approach
would be to require the implementation and funding of
programs that already have strong track records, such as
the Better Work program. Better Work found its start
in a trade agreement between the US and Cambodia
that required the implementation of an ILO-run program
called Better Factories. Better Factories generated pub-
lic information about conditions in Cambodian factories
and made that information public, initially both to lead
firms as well as to consumers and other stakeholders
(Arnold & Shih, 2010; Kolben, 2004; Oka, 2009, 2010; Po-
laski, 2009; Rossi & Robertson, 2011). This transparency
created an incentive for factories to improve regardless
of state enforcement. Better Work has evolved to com-
bine active consulting and advising of factories on labor
practices, while also continuing its auditing and industry-
wide transparency. It also brings multiple stakeholders
into its governance, including governments, unions, and
employers. (Kolben, 2015, p. 456) A number of schol-
ars have found noted improvements in working condi-
tions where Better Work has been implemented, includ-
ing in Cambodia (Berik & Rodgers, 2010, pp. 74–75; Rossi,
2015). Better Work has also been innovative in interact-
ing with the state with the aim of improving enforce-
ment of labor lawby laborministries, as has beendemon-
strated in case studies of its programs in Jordan and In-
donesia (Dupper et al., 2016; Kolben, 2015).
The benefit of building a program like Better Work
into a trade agreement, as it was in Cambodia, and po-
tentially into its tariff and rule structure, is that it creates
incentives for trading partners to fund and implement
the programs sufficiently and sustainably. By linking pro-
grams, like Better Work, or other iterations, to actual re-
wards and benefits in the trade agreement context, it
ensures that the parties take the obligations seriously,
and it provides more leverage to build in opportunities
for dialogue and cooperation with labor ministries and
the state. For example, one could create a graduated tar-
iff and non-tariff barrier reduction scheme, which would
grant benefits to partner countries in a graduated man-
ner only if they implement in good faith the supply chain
improvement institutions described earlier.
Some might argue that a more tailored approach,
such as the one suggested here, might be too limited.
But as I have tried to suggest, extant labor chapter ap-
proaches have been too broadly targeted with mixed
results. A tailored and governance centered approach
would potentially have more leverage by drawing on the
power of consumer citizens, and improving labor condi-
tions in supply chains could then have positive spillover
effects on other factories and industries not implicated
in those chains, although how this occurs requires more
examination (Weil & Mallo, 2007). Further, a targeted
approach might be considered to be more legitimate by
trading partners. Rather than the labor chapter being
viewed as a normative imposition by one state upon an-
other, it would be seen as motivated by the demands
and desires of consumer citizens grounded in the mar-
ket, and facilitated by their governments. Others might
also argue that given the mixed, if not poor, track record
of private monitoring (Locke, 2013), that the approach
proposed here might have no better prospects than the
state oriented one that has been suggested to underper-
form, aswell. But what ismost novel about this approach
is that it aims to integrate both public and private tools of
enforcement that harness the influence of consumer citi-
zens on lead firms. It is not a catchall solution, but rather
part of the “mosaic” that constitutes transnational labor
regulation (Trubek, Mosher, & Rothstein, 2000, p. 1189).
Finally, given the limited willingness by states to trigger
dispute settlement processes, what makes this solution
11 Vogt (2015) has raised the question in his critiques of FTA labor provisions if they make concrete improvements at the workplace level.
12 Alternatively, there could be one “super monitor” whose track record is well proven, such as the ILO. Although this has its own limitations (Kolben,
2007, p. 249).
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any more useful? For one, dispute settlement would be
diminished in importance, and thus states would have
a smaller hand in the effective implementation of labor
provisions. Second, power would be delegated to a neu-
tral body such as the ILO to act as a super monitor, which
would also decide if the labor chapter is being properly
implemented, thus triggering tariff reductions.
4. Conclusion
This article has argued that the state action–state sanc-
tions, and state action–social dialogue based models of
the US and EU are limited in their ability to effect change
in the labor conditions of trading partner countries. This
has been true in practice, and I have suggested is a con-
sequence of their design. Rather than aiming to change
labor law enforcement in isolation from the factors that
cause poor rule of law, this article has argued that la-
bor provisions ought to be embedded in a supply chain
approach that is informed by the legitimate drivers of
trade and labor chapters, such as consumer citizenship,
and that would satisfy expectations of fairness by domes-
tic constituencies that would oppose trade liberalization
where trading partners had low labor standards. Such an
approach focuses not on exporting norms to trading part-
ners by dialoguing or sanctioning poor labor law enforce-
ment, nor on using sanctions, but instead on tailored and
context specific interventions to improve labor standards
in supply chains that are involved in international trade
flows. In particular, it draws on regulatory innovations
grounded in consumer citizenship and experimentalism
that I have argued wield the potential to improve labor
chapter effectiveness and improve the lives of workers in
global supply chains.
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